African Insurgent Groups Look to ISIS as They Face Increasing Pressure

by Hanna Ucko Neill*

Since the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria in 2014, several groups around the world have expressed support for and even pledged allegiance to the terrorist group. ISIS already has a foothold in North Africa and the recent attack in Tunisia indicates a continued interest in the continent. The influence of ISIS has also spread to Sub-Saharan Africa, heightening concerns about the increase in terrorism and the effect that ISIS could have on national conflicts.

Two of the most significant African insurgent groups – Boko Haram in Nigeria and al-Shabaab in Somalia – are looking to ISIS, possibly to gain momentum as both groups face the increased pressure of successful military operations against them.

The Islamist group Boko Haram pledged its allegiance to ISIS in early March 2015, more specifically to the ‘Caliph of Muslims’ Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The pledge coincided with successful operations against Boko Haram carried out by a coalition of Nigerian forces and neighbouring countries affected by Boko Haram violence.

In mid-2014, Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan branded Boko Haram as ‘al-Qaeda in West Africa’. However, analysts maintained that Boko Haram was unlikely to become an al-Qaeda affiliate, since tactics such as killing Muslim civilians and kidnapping girls are counter to the thinking of the al-Qaeda leadership. Meanwhile, Boko Haram had firm links with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

Intelligence officials tracked visits by Boko Haram members to both Mali and Niger, where they reportedly met Algerian AQIM militants for training and to acquire weapons. However, AQIM has at times appeared uncomfortable with Boko Haram. Having seized northern Mali in 2012, AQIM encouraged its members to win the hearts and minds of the population, an approach quite contrary to Boko Haram’s brutal violence in northeastern Nigeria and ISIS’s activities in Iraq and Syria.

Boko Haram’s announcement of allegiance to ISIS coincides with its ousting from key towns in northeastern Nigeria. Nigerian government officials have been particularly keen to point out that the move must be interpreted as a sign of weakness. Others suggest that the group has been inspired by ISIS for some time and always planned to align itself with the terrorist group.

Boko Haram has a history of adaptability and has proven able to up its game when necessary. Challenged by ongoing military advances, tactics to up its game have thus far included brutal beheadings broadcast through increasingly sophisticated media. ISIS accepted Boko Haram’s pledge of allegiance in mid-March, but it remains difficult to assess how an alliance between the two groups would work in practice. However, ISIS’s call for its supporters to fight in Africa must be of some concern to governments in the region.

Meanwhile, Somalia’s al-Shabaab also appears to be flirting with the idea of associating itself with ISIS, having been seriously weakened by the African Union-ledOperation Indian Oceanand US airstrikes targeting its leaders. The issue has proven divisive within the group. Reports suggest that al-Shabaab’s intelligence chief Mahad Karate and a number of foreign fighters want to pledge allegiance to ISIS against the wishes of the group’s leader Ahmed Diriye ‘Abu Ubaidah’.

Al-Shabaab’s association with al-Qaeda was initiated by the group’s former leader Ahmed Abdi Godane, who was killed in a US airstrike in the Lower Shabelle region in Somalia in September 2014. Godane had led al-Shabaab since 2008, when his predecessor Aden Hashi Ayro was killed, also in a US airstrike. Trained in Afghanistan, Godane formally joined al-Qaeda in 2012, and during a bitter leadership purge in 2013 gained control of the faction previously headed by Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, the former Union of Islamic Courts leader.

Abu Ubaidah is opposed to the idea of ending the alliance with al-Qaeda, and pledged allegiance to the group shortly after he was appointed leader in 2014. He would most likely want to avoid division within the group’s leadership over the issue, not least because it undermines attempts to portray al-Shabaab as a cohesive group despite successful military operations against it.

Despite its much-depleted force and internal power struggles, al-Shabaab is not a spent force. The group remains a serious threat even in areas where it has been forced to retreat. Since it was pushed out of Mogadishu in August 2011, it has shifted to hit-and-run guerrilla-style tactics, often targeting civilians. It has kept up the pressure by attacking the seat of the Somali government, Villa Somalia, and it has blockaded liberated towns, preventing humanitarian aid and basic goods from entering.

Abu Ubaidah’s stance on the ISIS issue may prove irrelevant since many see Karate, who was overlooked as a successor to Godane, as the indirect leader of the group and its more-powerful figure. The push towards ISIS in the case of al-Shabaab may therefore have less to do with the ability of ISIS to capture the imagination of a new generation of jihadists and more to do with the internal leadership struggle. The future direction of al-Shabaab will no doubt be determined by who manages to sway the rest of the leadership.

The practical effect of the allegiance of Boko Haram to ISIS is unclear, but the direction of al-Shabaab with regard to ISIS remains undecided. A cautionary tale for governments in both countries is the situation in Libya, where the Islamic Youth Shura Council pledged allegiance to ISIS in November 2014. Since then, ISIS supporters have become a growing threat and have established themselves as a third actor in a complex political crisis alongside militia groups and military units aligned with the two rival governments. The involvement of ISIS in a national conflict can clearly only undermine peace, increase insecurity and threaten prospects for political solutions to end violence.

* Global Conflicts Analyst of  the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)

This article originally appeared in ACD News of IISS

(www.iiss.org)